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Abstract— Successful design of human-in-the-loop control sys-
tems requires appropriate models for human decision makers.
Whilst most paradigms adopted in the control systems literature
hide the (limited) decision capability of humans, in behavioral
economics individual decision making and optimization processes
are well-known to be affected by perceptual and behavioral
biases. Our goal is to enrich control engineering with some
insights from behavioral economics research through exposing
such biases in control-relevant settings.
This paper addresses the following two key questions:
1) How do behavioral biases affect decision making?
2) What is the role played by feedback in human-in-the-loop
control systems?
Our experimental framework shows how individuals behave
when faced with the task of piloting an UAV under risk and
uncertainty, paralleling a real-world decision-making scenario.
Our findings support the notion of humans in Cyberphysical
Systems underlying behavioral biases regardless of – or even
because of – receiving immediate outcome feedback. We observe
substantial shares of drone controllers to act inefficiently through
either flying excessively (overconfident) or overly conservatively
(underconfident). Furthermore, we observe human-controllers
to self-servingly misinterpret random sequences through being
subject to a “hot hand fallacy”. We advise control engineers
to mind the human component in order not to compromise
technological accomplishments through human issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our century is bringing interesting challenges and opportu-
nities that derive from the way that digital technology is shap-
ing how we live as individuals and as a society. A key feature
of a number of engineered systems is that they interact with
humans. Rather than solely affecting humans, often people
make decisions that have an effect on the engineered system.
As an example, when driving our cars we often decide to take
a route which differs from that suggested by the navigation
system. This information is fed back to the service provider
and henceforth used when making route suggestions to other
users. The analysis and design of such Cyber-physical Human
Systems (CPHSs) would benefit from an understanding of how
humans behave. However, given their immense complexity, it
is by no means clear how to formulate appropriate models for
human decision makers, especially when operating in closed
loop systems.
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CPHSs fit into the general context of human-machine sys-
tems and pose multidisciplinary challenges that have been
tackled in a number of domains. For example, interesting
surveys on signal processing approaches include [1] and
[2], whereas [3] adopts a computer science viewpoint. More
focused on specific applications, the articles in the special
issue [4] as well as [5] study the interaction between humans
and vehicles. The paper [6] surveys systems comprised of
humans and robot swarms and [7] reviews telemanipulation
by small unmanned systems. Also within the control systems
community significant advances have been made, see, e.g.,
[8], [9], [10], [11]. Here it is common to model the effect
of humans as a limited actuation resource or unknown deter-
ministic dynamics to be identified. This opens the door to use
various robust control and game theoretic methods to design
closed loop systems. However, most paradigms adopted in the
systems control literature so far hide the decision capability of
humans and limitations to their cognitive and computational
capabilities. Notable exceptions to the literature include [12]
and [13] where human decision making is characterized via
a Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (MDP) [14]
with states representing basic physical human aspects, such as
operator fatigue or proficiency. In particular, [13] investigates
a stochastic two player game, resulting from the interaction
between a human operator and an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV). Here the UAV is allowed to react to the decisions made
by the operator, to compensate for potential non-cooperative
behaviour. For a CPHS with multiple human decision makers,
[15] models limitations in their decision making capabilities
using “level-k reasoning” and associated game theory [16]:
Each agent optimizes a cost function using only reduced
knowledge of the other agents’ policies.
In the present work we investigate human decision mak-
ing from a behavioral economics perspective. We pose the
question how behavioral biases affect decision making, since
we expect behavioral influences to potentially hamper tech-
nological optimization efforts. More generally, we aim to
direct attention to the human as a poorly observed uncertainty
source in CPHS. We thus consider humans as being “bounded
rational”, i.e., they are strategic thinkers who want to maximize
their benefits but, at the same time, have only limited cognitive
and computational capabilities. We distinguish between closed
loop scenarios, where the decision maker receives feedback
about the success of its actions, and open loop situations,
where no such feedback information is available. Here, we
pay special attention to the role played by feedback on
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2behavioral biases in form of overconfidence [17] and the
so-called hot hand fallacy [18]. The latter effect may arise
when a decision maker becomes aware of her past success
and overestimates future success probabilities. We will next
introduce some prominent findings from behavioral economics
that can be regarded as influential for CPHSs. These will be
subsequently applied to an experimental human-in-the-loop
framework inspired by the UAV piloting scenario of [13].
Throughout our presentation we will highlight the value of
giving greater consideration to human behavior and behavioral
biases in control engineering. The central outcome of our
study is that frequent feedback to human decision makers
may lead to sub-optimal results. This stands in contrast to
situations wherein computers carry out optimizations and more
information is always beneficial [19], [14], [20]. As we shall
see, when humans act as decision makers, then the situation
is more ambiguous.
II. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Behavioral economics is a comparably young research field
that is concerned with the overarching question of how humans
actually do behave in economic decisions, in contrast to
how they are prescribed to behave by economic theory [21].
Therefore, traditional economic assumptions and models are
revised and enriched by insights from psychology. This serves
to improve the understanding and predictability of human
behavior, especially regarding recurring errors and biases in
decision making [22]. The perception of humans thereby shifts
from the assumption of a rationally optimizing Markov deci-
sion maker towards regarding humans as rather bounded ratio-
nal agents. Humans constantly use cognitive mechanisms of
simplification, namely decision heuristics, in order to process
information and make decisions under uncertainty [21], [23].
Such heuristics are used subconsciously due to individuals not
managing to adequately process the complexity of a decision
problem or to take all relevant information into account [22].
In fact, when making judgments or estimations of events,
frequencies or probabilities under uncertainty, individuals do
not always obey Bayesian rules and statistical logic, as they
are meant to do in models assuming perfectly rational agents
and Markov decision makers. Such heuristic simplifications
sometimes yield reasonable judgments, but may also lead to
severe and systematic errors [24], [25], [26]. Interestingly, even
experienced researchers and professionals often underlie the
same judgment heuristics and biases as laypersons do [25].
A. Overconfidence
Overconfidence is well-known to be one of multiple be-
havioral stylized facts influencing and thereby biasing hu-
man decision making. Overconfidence can be defined as a
general miscalibration in beliefs [27], more specifically, the
discrepancy between confidence and accuracy [17]. In being
overconfident, people overestimate their own capabilities, their
knowledge or the general favorability of future prospects [28].
The authors of [29] go as far as labeling overconfidence the
most robust finding in the psychology of judgment.
Early contributions to research on overconfidence found that
people systematically tended to be unrealistically optimistic
about their future, in judging themselves to be more likely
to experience a variety of positive events, and to be less
likely to experience negative events, compared to others. This
pattern has been traced back mainly to the degree of desir-
ability influencing the perceived probability of such events
[30]. In the original study [31] over 80% of the subjects
regarded themselves as more skillful and less risky car drivers
than the average driver. Moreover, one half of the subjects
estimated themselves to be amongst the top 20% of the
sample, vividly illustrating overconfidence as the discrepancy
between confidence and accuracy (belief and reality) in doing
so. Meanwhile, evidence on overconfidence does not depend
on whether or not experimental subjects are familiar to the
given tasks or actions [32]. The tasks difficulty, on the other
hand, is known to have an impact on overconfidence, as
more difficult tasks were shown to facilitate overconfidence
rather than easy tasks [27], [33]. Overconfidence can express
itself, and consequently has been studied, in multiple ways,
like ‘better-than-average’ beliefs, e.g. [32]), or ‘overprecision’,
e.g. [34]). The facet of overconfidence most fitting for the
purpose of our current work appears to be overestimation,
described as self-servingly overestimating the likelihood of
desirable outcomes, supposedly fueled by wishful thinking for
such desirable outcomes to occur* [36], [37]. An experimental
approach for studying overconfidence was requested in [32], as
most research in this field merely relies on verbal statements or
subjective estimations, rather than monitoring human decision-
behavior. Our current analysis makes a contribution to this call.
Overconfidence is connected to a variety of other behavioral
phenomena, which will be revised in the sequel.
B. Underestimation of systematic risks
Analogous to overestimating favorable outcomes, overconfi-
dence also implies underestimating risks, or rather the variance
of risky processes, indicating a too narrow distribution in one’s
subjective probability beliefs [38]. Often, humans assess prob-
abilities incorrectly or rather draw incorrect conclusions from
them through not adhering to Bayesian rules or neglecting
base-rates [24], [39]. In doing so, smaller probabilities are
usually overestimated while larger probabilities are underesti-
mated [40], [41]. Vice versa, decision makers are also found
to underestimate the overall likelihood of the occurrence of
risks with small single probabilities of occurrence in some
instances. Especially risks of disqualification [42] through low-
probability events generate less concern than their probability
warrants on average [43]. A cognitive process behind this
underestimation of especially very low probability risks, like
being involved in car crashes or natural disasters, can be char-
acterized as subconsciously approximating low probabilities
with zero in order to not having to mentally deal with them
anymore [44].
Consequences of this issue can be observed in various
areas of economic and social decision making. Overconfident
*Overconfidence is therefore regarded as closely related to self-deception,
see e.g. [35].
3individuals, who underestimate health, financial or driving
risks, are more likely to have insufficiently low insurance
coverage against such risks [45]. Furthermore, employees are
observed to underestimate the risk of their own company’s
stock and being overly optimistic about its future performance.
They tend to include such stocks too heavily into their retire-
ment plans, despite the respective stock being riskier than the
overall market, as a consequence of excessive extrapolation of
positive past performance [46]. Money being at stake does
neither change overconfident behavior, nor does it lead to
better estimation results concerning abilities, probabilities or
risk. Experimental evidence was obtained on overconfidence
leading to overly rushed market entries, that often precede
business failures, due to entrepreneurs overestimating their
relative chances to succeed [47]. Overconfident top-managers
were further shown to underestimate the volatility of cash
flows of S&P 500 companies, resulting in erroneous invest-
ment and financing decisions, in a large-scale survey over
10 years [38]. Especially managers competing for leadership
positions display overconfidence by tending to take on riskier
projects due to underestimating their risks [48]. Overconfident
CEOs also overestimate the positive impact of their leadership
and their ability to successfully complete a merger to generate
future company value. These CEOs are found to execute value-
destroying mergers, thereby exposing the affected companies
to high financial or even existential risks [49]. Multiple ex-
perimental studies found that overconfident investors trade
more excessively than others, overestimate the impact of
little information they have [50], [51], and do not adjust
their trading volume to new negative information [52]. These
findings, which are inconsistent with the Markov assumption
and Bayesian updating, contradict theoretical expectations of
rationally optimizing economic agents and re-emphasize the
notion of individuals as bounded rational decision makers [21].
C. Attribution theory
Another mechanism contributing overconfident decision
making is a biased perception of causality in a self-serving
way. Accordingly, individuals express the tendency to attribute
positive past outcomes to themselves and their abilities, while
blaming negative outcomes on external circumstances [53].
Successes are internalized, failures are externalized [54]. In
an early experiment, teachers attributed learning successes of
their pupils to their teaching skills, while blaming bad learning
performances on the pupils themselves [55]. This self-serving
attribution bias was identified to be the major driver of the
aforementioned CEO overconfidence leading to risky mergers
[56]. In [57] overconfidence evolves when traders get feedback
about their ability through experience in a multiperiod market
model and overweigh the role of their ability on prior success.
Overconfident investors subsequently tend to become even
more overconfident in their future investments. Meanwhile,
financial losses are rather attributed to environmental cir-
cumstances, like unfavorable macroeconomic developments or
simply bad luck, with the investors degree of overconfidence
remaining constant [58], [59]. Also, professionals were found
to be as likely as laypersons to express overconfidence in
making economic decisions as well as in re-evaluating the
quality of their own previous decision in hindsight [60].
People overestimate their own capabilities as well as their
control over future events that are actually determined by
external factors, especially chance. This was illustrated in an
experimental study in which participants were either given a
lottery ticket (control group) or allowed to select a lottery
ticket themselves (treatment group). Subjects who had chosen
their ticket themselves were, on average, demanding four times
more money than those who were simply given their tickets,
when asked to name a price they would sell it for. Those who
chose the ticket themselves mistakenly assumed they would
therefore be more likely to win, although the winners would
be determined entirely by chance. This mechanism has been
labeled the “illusion of control” [54], although critics of this
concept have argued that it rather identifies a pattern of people
overestimating their ability to predict future outcomes than of
people overestimating their ability to control future outcomes
[61]. Both interpretations are regarded as sufficient for the
purpose of our current analysis.
D. The role of feedback in overconfidence
Providing feedback is commonly regarded as an efficient
learning mechanism in Markov Decision Processes in order
to compute optimal behavior [62], [14], [19] and offers great
value for deriving logical inference rules in accordance with
Bayesian reasoning in machine learning [63], [64]. While
these points may hold true for cyber-physical systems without
human decision makers, humans are often observed to react
to feedback differently. Contradicting Markovian assumptions,
behavioral economic research constantly observes errors in
updating the information set (e.g., [65], [66]). This indicates
that providing more feedback information to humans does
not necessarily lead to better estimations and decisions. The
importance of outcome feedback in counteracting certain be-
havioral biases, through continuous “monitoring of progress
through a judgment-action-outcome loop” [67] and offering
corrective adjustments, has been pointed out before [68], but
it may not apply equally to every type of bias.
While research studying the connection of high information
supply to overconfidence is comparably scarce, in various
instances a higher amount of feedback was not found to
be able to improve behavioral rationality with regards to
overconfidence, as it would be expected by theory. Both
overconfidence and underconfidence were shown to persist in
employees’ choices of incentive schemes although receiving
clear feedback revealing the optimal alternative for them [69].
Experiments on sports outcome-estimation showed that over-
confidence did not decrease but rather increase with additional
information, as the subjects confidence increases more than
their accuracy does [70]. Similarly, CEO overconfidence in
forecasts was found to persist against corrective feedback [71]
and venture capitalists were shown to be more overconfident
when having access to more information [72]. In general
knowledge tasks that are related to each other, corrective
outcome feedback has shown able to mitigate underconfidence
but not overconfidence [73]. It turns out that feedback appears
4to affect behavioral biases rather ambiguously with overconfi-
dence tending to largely persist, or even growing, in response
to additional information.
E. Misperceptions of random sequences
With regards to human sequential decision processes, an-
other potential threat of high information supply leading to
biased decision making, is the danger of falling subject to the
hot hand fallacy. The study of this error in the assessment
of past outcomes originates in observations from basketball.
If this player repeatedly scored on his past throws, he is
commonly judged to have a hot hand by his teammates and the
audience. Therefore, the player’s likelihood of scoring on fu-
ture throws is judged to increase by the audience, even though
future throws are independent of past throws. In doing so, the
player’s objective probability of scoring is overestimated based
on his past successes [18]. This hot hand fallacy results from
misjudging statistically independent favorable events to be
connected to one another, implying a positive autocorrelation
between them. Repeated past positive outcomes are therefore
erroneously expected to occur again in the near future, thereby
overestimating their objective probability of occurrence. The
hot hand fallacy is a very vivid illustration of biased probabil-
ity judgments through presumed representativeness of recent
information. Misinterpretations of random sequences through
such extrapolation of recent outcomes into the future were
empirically found to apply to several contexts. Regarding
basketball, the findings by [18] were supported by studies on
basketball betting market odds, although only small effects
were found [74], [75]. In a laboratory experiment, simulating
a blackjack game, gamblers were observed to bet more money
after a series of wins than after a series of losses [76]. In
more sensitive contexts, individual decisions show signs of
the hot hand fallacy as well. For instance, financial investors
who had negative prior experiences with low stock returns,
exhibit a decreased willingness to take financial risks in future
investments [77]. Attribution theory, especially the illusion of
control mentioned above, may factor into the hot hand assump-
tion as well, since subjects are more likely to attribute recent
sequences with low alternation to human skilled performance,
while sequences with high alternation are rather perceived as
chance processes [78].
Before proceeding, we note that the hot hand fallacy’s
opposing bias, the so-called gamblers fallacy, presents the
erroneous expectation of systematic reversals in stochastic
processes. These are grounded in the belief that a small sample
should be representative for the underlying population, i.e.,
that a Bernoulli random process should balance out even across
few rounds [79]. Both phenomena have recently been strongly
disputed in their status as biases [80], [81].
III. SURVEILLANCE DRONE PILOTING FRAMEWORK AND
HYPOTHESES
Our experimental design for analyzing behavioral biases
in CPHSs builds upon a basic setup involving UAVs that
interact with human operators, as discussed in [13] and which
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Fig. 1. Illustration of a road network for UAV missions, adapted from [13].
A single drone follows a given path overflying 10 junctions. At each junction
j ∈ {1,2, . . .10} a maximum of N = 8 rounds can be flown.
is graphically illustrated in Fig. 1. Partly autonomous UAVs
are used for road network surveillance inside a network that
connects multiple traffic junctions. The drone pilot’s objective
is to gain the maximum information about the traffic at all
junctions using a single drone which follows a predesigned
path, see Fig. 1. To increase the picture quality (and thereby
the information obtained), the operator may choose to fly up to
8 rounds over each junction j, each round taking an additional
photo. The individual photos are combined into a higher-
resolution image, whose total value will be denoted Ij . This
total value depends on the number of flights, say fj , and on
the random additional information content of each photo taken.
The situation is modelled via the random process σj(i) which
quantifies the information content of the combined photo of
junction j at round i. The process is initiated at σj(1) = 25
and through iteration of
σj(i + 1) = σj(i) + sj(i)ρ(σj(i)), i = 1,2, . . . , fj − 1, (1)
leads to Ij = σj(fj).
Here, the additional information content of the photo taken
at round i is quantified by the concave function ρ(⋅) which
describes a decreasing marginal yield:
ρ(25) = 25, ρ(50) = 20, ρ(70) = 10,
ρ(80) = ρ(85) = ρ(90) = ρ(95) = 5. (2)
The above reflects the fact that each additional picture often
comes with less information value added, since a rough image
of the traffic flow is already gained by the earlier pictures, and
subsequent pictures only help further sharpening the image. In
(1), sj(i) ∈ {0,1} is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random process, with
probability P [sj(i) = 1] = p. This models instances wherein
the new picture offers no information value added over the
previous one due to, for instance, bad weather causing poor
visibility, strong wind or lacking flow of traffic.
Whilst taking more photos will often lead to combined
images of higher quality and also with more information
content, after each individual flight there exists a (small)
probability of r of the drone crashing, leading to a loss of
D (the value of the UAV) and the inability to continue flying
again over the current or later junctions.
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Fig. 2. Human-in-the loop control system: The operator decides how many
times the UAV should fly over each junction in order to gain accurate
information about traffic conditions in the city. To assist in the decision
making, the drone may send feedback information about the picture quality,
i.e., information gained.
Given the above, the value of the image obtained
at each junction j belongs to the finite set{0,25,50,70,80,85,90,95,100}. The current combined
value of the drone and images after flying i rounds at junction
j satisfies
Vj(i) =Dcj(i) + σj(i) + j−1∑`=1 I`, (3)
where
cj(i) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if the drone is still intact
after flying i rounds at junction j,
0, otherwise.
(4)
The total value gained by the operator at the end of the mission
is given by:
V = 400c10(f10) + 10∑
j=1 Ij . (5)
A. Decision problem
Given the possibility of the drone crashing, rather than
simply intending to fly the maximum number of 8 rounds over
each junction, the operator is faced with the decision of how
many rounds to fly over each junction in order to maximize its
profit V . This amounts to a sequential stopping rule problem
defined over a finite horizon. To make decisions when to fly (or
switch) to the next junction, in addition to knowing the system
model and its probabilities, the operator receives feedback
from the drone, see Fig. 2. Every time the UAV passes over a
junction, it sends back σj(i), the information gain obtained so
far over the current junction. Further the operator, is informed
whether the drone has crashed. Using this information, the
human operator is faced with the task of designing a closed
loop flight policy.
The exact stopping rule can, in principle, be derived using
dynamic programming [20], [82]. However, the value function
depends not only on the value σj(i), but also on the current
round i as well as the junction j, with later junctions having
less value. Thus, instead of pursuing an optimal strategy, a
1-stage look-ahead rule within the current junction becomes
a reasonable alternative. Using such a myopic policy, the
operator chooses to flight another round over the current
junction j if and only if the drone is intact (cj(i) = 1), i ≤ 8
and the marginal gain of flying one more round is positive:
g(σ) ≜ E[Vj(i+1)−Vj(i) ∣σj(i) = σ] = pρ(σ)−Dr > 0, (6)
where we have used (3), see also Fig. 3.
In the sequel we will fix the parameters to D = 400, p = 0.5
and r = 0.02, so that (2) provides
g(25) = 4.5, g(50) = 2, g(70) = −3,
g(80) = g(85) = g(90) = g(95) = −5.5. (7)
This makes flying until an information value σj(i) = 70 is
accumulated in the current junction the optimal choice. From
the fourth node onwards, the marginal gain from flying another
round is lower than the marginal loss, therefore a rational (and
risk-neutral) agent should refrain from flying further rounds.
In addition to this full feedback case, we will also consider
a situation wherein the drone does not transmit the feedback
information σj(i) to the operator. This requires the operator
to design an open loop policy [19], as detailed below.
B. Experimental drone framework
In our behavioral economic engineering project (see Sidebar
“Behavioral Economic Engineering”), we abstract the frame-
work into an economic experiment (see Sidebar “Experimental
research method and Induced Value theory”) in order to gain
insights on actual individual behavior in human-in-the-loop
control. The experiment translates the CPHS concepts of open
versus closed loop control into a sequential decision making
game, framed in a context in which the subjects are owners
to an UAV with a photo function. They are told that they
were hired by the local city administration to support the
city’s traffic surveillance by taking photos of ten important
traffic junctions. As outlined above, the subjects’ task is to
decide, how many rounds the UAV should fly over each of
the 10 traffic junctions (up to a maximum of 8 times), while
the drone would fly and take pictures autonomously. Subjects
are incentivized, as they are paid according to the amount of
information value gained through the pictures their drones take
in the fictitious currency “Taler”, with one Taler equaling one
unit of information value gathered. Taler are exchanged into
Euro, after all parts of the experiment are completed. However,
during each round in which a UAV flies, it faces a constant
crash risk of r = 2%. At the end of this job, i.e., after all
ten traffic junctions, subjects are able sell their drone for an
additional fixed payment of D = 400 Taler, as long as it is still
intact at this point, see (5).
Each traffic junction represents one stage of the experiment.
For the sake of simplicity, subjects do not have to bear any
costs from flying the drone. Further, the drone’s value does
not diminish from usage and subjects are told that batteries
for the drones as well as (ground) transport between the traffic
junctions is provided free of charge by the city administration.
One battery charging allows the drone to fly up to eight
6Fig. 3. Marginal gains within each junction, for D = 400. Diagonal arrows describe an increase in information value with a subsequent crash, vertical arrows
represent a non-increase with a subsequent crash. Note that the maximum information value gain attainable at each traffic junction, namely 100, can only be
reached if a subject decides to fly all eight rounds possible while obtaining an increase in each round.
rounds before the drone must land to recharge. Therefore,
subjects are able to decide for a maximum of eight rounds per
traffic junction and consequently take up to eight pictures. This
corresponds to a maximum of eight nodes that can be reached
per junction. In the first round flown over each traffic junction,
an information value of σj(1) = 25 is gained with certainty, as
any picture taken represents an increase in information value
over no picture taken at all. From the second round onwards,
the information value potentially gained per round decreases,
see (2). For the sake of simplification, a crash can only happen
after a picture is taken. As per (5), the information value
gained at the junction where the crash occurs up to the point
of it, still qualifies for the payment, as subjects were told that
the drone’s memory chip would survive the crash.
The operators need to decide how many rounds a UAV
should fly over each traffic junction in order to maximize the
total gain V in (5) and consequent payoff. In order to do so,
some of them receive feedback on the results of the previous
rounds – depending on the treatment – which they can base
their decision on. As noted before, the resulting optimization
problem belongs to the class of general stopping problems.
Its solution, both with and without feedback information, can
in principle be derived, but requires careful computations.
Since individuals are well-known to have limited cognitive and
computational capabilities, they will not be able to compute a
globally optimal strategy. Instead, optimizing subjects will use
the decision heuristic in (6), i.e., the fourth node is identified
as the one to reach.
The above leads to two decision heuristics, depending on
whether feedback information is available or not. In the former
(closed loop heuristic), at every junction the UAV should aim
to fly as many rounds as needed until reaching an information
value of σj(i) = 70. To be more precise, introduce aj(i) ∈{0,1}, where aj(i) = 1 corresponds to the decision to fly
another round over the current junction, then the closed loop
heuristic can be stated via:
aj(i) = 1, if and only if σj(i) < 70 and i ≤ 8
and the drone is intact. (8)
Note that in this case, the total number of rounds flown over
a junction j, namely fj = ∑aj(i), depends on the sequence
of increases and non-increases the subject experiences.
In the absence of feedback from the drone, a suitable open
loop heuristic amounts to attempting to fly fj = 5 times at
every junction:
aj(i) = 1, if and only if i ≤ 4 and the drone is intact. (9)
This yields the expected result of three increases in informa-
tion value, with the first one being granted with certainty in
the first round. The above rules of thumb present reasonable
heuristic approximations to the task’s optimal solution when
implemented for all junctions. A rational and risk-neutral
decision maker, who acts according to expected utility theory
[83], would follow these heuristics. Deviations from these
decision-rules upwards or downwards represent indicators of
overconfidence or underconfidence respectively, depending on
the direction.
The experiment ends either after all junctions are completed
and the drone is sold or once the drone has crashed. A crash
could be caused by external factors like weather conditions,
the drone hitting some object or animal, or technical failure.
This risk of a total loss of the drone’s value in case of a
crash imposes the prospect of high one-time costs onto the
participants and thus prevents them from simply choosing the
maximum number of rounds possible at every traffic junction.
As subjects are paid according to the information value gained,
striving for the optimal information value (using the above
heuristic) presents the rational strategy. Always flying the
maximum number of 8 rounds is not efficient, as gaining
information value has to be weighed against maintaining the
chance of being able to sell the drone at the end of the
experiment, as indicated in (5).
C. Hypotheses
The variety of behavioral phenomena and stylized facts re-
garding decision biases and errors in relation to overconfidence
presented in the preceding section, suggests inefficient human
decision making. In fact, individuals are commonly observed
to act overconfidently. In doing so, they tend to underestimate
systematic risks, insufficiently process joint and conditional
7probabilities, self-servingly misattribute causal relationships
and erroneously expect favorable outcome sequences to con-
tinue in the future. These aspects should be particularly
relevant in our example, since the probability of the drone
crashing may appear small for one specific round (2%), while
the overall risk of the UAV crashing at any time over the
course of the experiment is substantially higher. Modeling
the crash probability as a Bernoulli process, the chance of a
crash when attempting to fly the maximum number of rounds
at each of the ten junctions would be 1 − 0.9880 > 0.8.
A narrow focus on the low single-decision crash probabil-
ity [84] could therefore lead subjects to underestimate the
overall crash probability and consequently take higher risk.
Providing feedback is commonly assumed to diminish these
behavioral biases but known to not being able to entirely
resolve them, and in some instances even aggravating them.
Subjects may rather attribute positive feedback to their own
decision performance to themselves instead of realizing that it
is caused by chance. All these aspects point in the direction
of expecting overconfident drone piloting. Manager overcon-
fidence in economic decision making can be summarized
to originate in either overestimating expected cash flows or
underestimating risk [85]. Translated to our design, the drone
pilots’ overconfidence could either result from overestimating
the likelihood of information value improvements or from
underestimating the risk of the UAV crashing. While the task
is framed in a quite understandable context, it is non-trivial
in its solution. Most subjects are expected to approach the
task rather intuitively, i.e., not solving it systematically through
comparing marginal gain and marginal costs, and consequently
act overconfidently through one of its facets described above,
if not through both. According to the general consensus of
literature on overconfidence in human decision making, the
following hypothesis is posed:
a) H1: Drone pilots will generally act overconfidently in
flying more than the optimal number of rounds, regardless of
feedback.
As is also known from the literature, individuals are prone
to unreflectively repeat decisions that previously yielded them
positive outcomes, even though such past successes entirely
depended on chance and have no impact on future outcomes
at all. This decision heuristic, the hot hand fallacy already
discussed, presents a major misinterpretation of random se-
quences. While the hot hand fallacy in regard to the original
study on basketball throws [18] is subject to criticism today
(with the data being re-analyzed and the conclusion being
reversed [80]), the general idea of individuals misjudging the
meaning of random outcome sequences remains to be tested
in the context of CPHS. For sequential decision problems
featuring feedback from the system, decision makers appear
especially vulnerable to fall victim to the hot hand fallacy.
Translated to our drone framework, it is therefore expected
that those drone pilots who immediately reach the optimal
information value of a junction through experiencing gains in
repeated rounds in the closed loop system (as the possibility
is only given there), perceive themselves to be “on a roll”,
i.e., as having an equivalent to a hot hand†. Since decision
makers are tempted to expect such apparent trends to continue,
they will likely fly beyond the optimal number of rounds,
overconfidently making their operation inefficient with regards
to risk and reward. This way, subjects fall victim to the hot
hand fallacy‡ Compared to the gamblers fallacy, a hot hand is
considered more suitable to portray drone controllers behavior
in his attempt to gather information value, with humans more
prone to expect favorable outcomes to repeat under their
apparent control [78].§. This leads to our second hypothesis:
b) H2: Sequences of immediate positive feedback will
lead to drone pilots falling victim to the hot hand fallacy.
These two hypotheses were tested in an experiment in-
volving students at Paderborn University in September 2019.
Details are given next.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In order to be able to compare behavioral effects in closed
and open loop operation, a between-subject design experiment
is conducted, meaning each subject can only participate in
exactly one treatment with the groups being compared after-
wards.
A. Treatments
To evaluate the effect of feedback in human-in-the-loop
control, two treatments are presented: Closed Loop and Open
Loop. The groups differ only in the fact that subjects in one of
them receive immediate outcome feedback after every decision
made, while subjects in the other group do not receive any
feedback until the end of the experiment.
In the Closed Loop Treatment, subjects receive feedback
directly after each round of each junction on whether an
increase in information value was gained in this specific
round, see Fig. 3. They were also informed about the current
total information value gained for the respective junction and
whether the drone was still intact. Subsequently, they were
asked whether they wanted to fly another round. The framing
in the instructions said that the drone would transmit the
pictures taken to the drone pilots laptops immediately, so
feedback was given just in time for the next rounds decision.
In the Open Loop Treatment, subjects are provided with no
feedback at all. Subjects make decisions on how many rounds
the drone should fly over each junction entirely in advance.
Afterwards, they are informed about the total information
value they obtained and whether the drone is still intact
†In our experiment, we define a hot hand as three consequent increases
from the very start of a junction. With the junctions being distinct from
each other and the first success being certain anyway, there is no possibility
of pattern overlays [81]. Therefore, as well as due to the outcome of a
fourth flight being unimportant for judging the decision inefficient, we do
not consider our results subject to ”streak selection bias” [80].
‡Literature observes a shift from hot hand beliefs for shorter outcome
streaks towards a gamblers fallacy pattern for increasing streak length [86],
[79]. Drone controllers who experience multiple increases in a row would
therefore begin to overestimate the probability of a non-increase at some point
and stop flying to prevent a crash accordingly.
§Also, a hot hand fallacy can be considered the more problematic error
compared to the gamblers fallacy, since in the case of the latter, subjects
would stop earlier and not risk a drone crash through flying in periods that
yield marginal losses (although sacrificing marginal gain).
8and sold at the end of the experiment. The framing in the
instructions states that the UAV has to be deconstructed in
a complex procedure to be able to extract and read out the
memory chip to check on the pictures taken. Therefore, no
feedback on the pictures would be provided until either all
junctions were completed or the drone had crashed.
B. Procedure
The experiment was computerized using the experiment
software oTree [87] and hosted centrally on a university server,
so subjects could remotely access the experiment and did
not have to come to the laboratory physically. 500 subjects
who previously had enrolled voluntarily into the BaER-Lab¶
student participant pool were chosen randomly, with 250 each
being randomly assigned to the two treatments in advance.
These subjects were contacted via the online recruitment
system ORSEE [88] and invited to participate within the
following five days.
The invitation email included a hyperlink that directed the
subjects to their respective treatment, where they received
the detailed instructions for the experiment. The instructions
of both treatments only differed regarding the provision of
feedback, as explained above. To be able to progress to
the drone flying task, subjects had to correctly solve four
control questions. The questions revolved around the central
parameters of the experimental design in order to assure that
the subjects had read and understood the instructions in its
critical parts. Subsequently, subjects advanced to the drone
flying task, in which they had to make their decisions through
clicking single choice buttons. Subjects would receive one unit
of the fictitious currency Taler for each unit of information
value gained as pay for flying the drone. During the whole ex-
periment, one subject’s payoffs did not depend on the decisions
of any other subject. After completing the drone flying task,
a result screen presented the total information value accrued
over all traffic junctions, the state of the drone, i.e., whether
it was still intact and consequently sold to earn 400 additional
Taler or not, as well as the corresponding payoffs the subject
generated in Euros. Payoffs were translated from Taler to Euro
at an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 120 Taler. Subjects were then
asked to answer a standardized questionnaire, that included
questions on demographics, perceived task difficulty and the
subject’s reasons for choosing the numbers of rounds the way
they did. Afterwards, subjects were presented with the multiple
price list of [89] (see Sidebar “Multiple Price List Format”),
in order to measure their risk preferences.
Filling out the price list was incentivized, as for every
fifteenth subject one out of the list’s twenty rows was randomly
selected and the payoffs that the subjects chosen alternative
row yielded in this row was added to the his total payoffs.
In case Alternative A had been selected by the subject, the
fixed amount stated in the respective row was simply added
to its payoffs. In case Alternative B had been selected, the
lottery was automatically played out and either e0 or e30
were added to the subject’s payoffs. After completing the price
¶BaER-Lab stands for “Business and Economic Research Laboratory”.
For further information visit www.baer-lab.org.
TABLE I
AVERAGE VALUES OF ROUNDS FLOWN, GAINED INFORMATION VALUE V ,
EARNINGS ∆m AND CRASH RATES, BY TREATMENT. STANDARD
DEVIATIONS ARE PRESENTED IN PARENTHESIS.
Closed Loop Open Loop
Average rounds flown 5.89 5.10
(2.08) (1.82)
Average information value 651.84 509.90
gained in total (397.56) (380.13)
Average earnings 5.43 4.30
in Euro (3.31) (3.17)
Crash rate 52.63% 68.75%
list, subjects were informed about whether the list came into
effect for their payoffs, and in case it did which row had been
selected. On a final screen, subjects were informed about their
total payoffs in Euros and thanked for their participation.
A subject’s total payoff function can consequently be for-
malized as
∆m = 1
120
V + d(`)i=15x (10)
where V is the total value, as in (5). The term d(`) represents
the additional payoff from the multiple price list, conditional
on the selected row ` of the list that a subject was paid in case
of being a fifteenth participant, i.e., a subjects participant’s ID
being a multiple of 15.
Subjects were able to collect their payoffs in cash at the
Chair’s secretariat following their participation by stating a
unique eight-figure ID-Code they had to create in the begin-
ning of the experiment. That way the correct payoffs could
be handed out to each subject, while maintaining anonymity
about the subject’s decisions made.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Out of the 105 subjects who finished the online experiment,
57 participated in the Closed Loop and 48 in the Open
Loop treatment respectively. The average age of the subjects
was 23.87 years and varied by about half a year between
treatments. 31 subjects (29.52%) were female, while one
subject classified itself as “diverse”. On average, subjects
earned e4.89 from the experiment, plus the amount they would
earn from filling out the multiple price list in case they were
paid due to being a fifteenth participant.
Subjects in the Closed Loop treatment flew, on average,
5.89 rounds over each traffic junction, thereby exceeding the
average number of rounds from the Open Loop treatment by
0.79 rounds per junction. Over all rounds flown, subjects in
the Closed Loop treatment gained a cumulative information
value of 651.84, on average. This represents a 27.83% surplus
compared to the average information value gained in the
Open Loop treatment. Similarly, a higher drone crash rate of
nearly 70% was observed in the Open Loop group. These two
dimensions generally interact, since the information value is
fixed, once a drone crashes. Averages of rounds flown and
accumulated information value as well as average earnings
and crash rates for each treatment are displayed in Table I.
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AVERAGE SHARES OF OVERCONFIDENT, UNDERCONFIDENT AND OPTIMAL
DECISIONS. STANDARD DEVIATIONS ARE PRESENTED IN PARENTHESIS.
Closed Loop Open Loop
Overconfidence 0.4410 0.4167
degree (.3628) (.3497)
Underconfidence 0.3091 0.3833
degree (.3099) (.3309)
Optimizing 0.2521 0.200
degree (.2581) (.2388)
As could be expected from control theoretic results [19],
the Closed Loop system is clearly observed to be more
effective than the Open Loop piloting system, with regards
to accumulating information about traffic conditions in our
framework. Considerably more information value was aggre-
gated with a closed loop of immediate outcome feedback
being implemented, which also translates to a higher monetary
payoff for the subjects. However, subjects displayed behavioral
biases as we will see. Indeed, the average number of rounds
in the Closed Loop treatment being nearly six already hints
that several subjects tended to fly beyond the heuristically
optimal number of rounds. In doing so, they would have
taken inefficiently high risks, since marginal losses exceeded
marginal gains in later rounds of each junctions. For instance,
instead of aiming to add five or ten more units of information
value when already sitting at 70, subjects should stop and
continue with the next traffic junction to obtain twenty-five
units of information value with certainty at the same crash
risk.
A. Overconfidence and underconfidence
To determine whether a subject acts overconfidently, opti-
mally or even underconfidently at a certain traffic junction,
the number of rounds flown is compared to the heuristics
discussed before, see (6). If the subject flew beyond the
heuristically optimal number of rounds, the decision at this
junction is noted as overconfident. If the subject decides to
fly less rounds than optimal the junction’s decision indicates
underconfidence. In case the heuristic is met the subject acts
optimizing.
As mentioned before, flying until the fourth node is reached
(associated with an information value of 70) is a suitable
heuristic for a risk neutral decision maker. This induces
different strategies for the treatments. In the closed loop
system, it is optimal for the subjects to fly as many rounds
as necessary to reach the fourth node. The actual number of
rounds needed depends on the sequence of increases and non-
increases experienced, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the open loop
system, meanwhile, flying five rounds is a suitable heuristic.
As subjects have to decide on the number of rounds to fly for
all traffic junctions in advance, this strategy applies to all of
them, as explained before.
An indicator for overconfidence on the subject-level is cre-
ated by calculating the quotient of the number of overconfident
junctions and the total number of junctions per subject, since
Fig. 4. Average shares of overconfident, underconfident and optimal decisions
the number of traffic junctions played differed between sub-
jects due to some drones crashing prematurely. This relative
frequency of overconfident junctions by a subject will be
labeled “overconfidence degree”. Degrees of underconfidence
and optimizing behavior are computed analogously, so all three
degrees add up to 1. The average degrees of each of these
behavioral tendencies are displayed in Table II.
The average overconfidence degree of 0.44 in the closed
loop system means that subjects, on average, decided over-
confidently for 44% of the traffic junctions. Comparatively,
overconfidence degrees do barely differ between the two
treatments with subjects deciding overconfidently for over
42% of the junctions. The average underconfidence degree was
higher in the Open Loop treatment. Degrees of overconfidence
and underconfidence are relatively close to each other for the
open loop, while overconfidence characterizes the predomi-
nating behavioral tendency in the closed loop system. The
optimization degree drops off in both treatments, with subjects
only deciding optimally at one fourth and one fifth of the
junctions respectively. This gap also becomes apparent in the
graphic illustration of the average degrees of overconfidence,
underconfidence and optimization displayed in Fig. 4. Degrees
of overconfidence did not differ significantly by gender in
either treatment.
Seven subjects in the Closed Loop and eight subjects in
the Open Loop group behaved overconfidently in every single
phase they flew in, resulting in the maximum overconfidence
degree of 1. On the other side, only three subjects in the
closed loop system and two in the open loop system decided
optimally for every junction, while three subjects in each
treatment acted underconfidently at every junction. Among
those junctions in which subjects act overconfidently, they
flew, on average, 2.88 (SD = 1.36) more rounds after reaching
the optimal node in the Closed Loop treatment. In the Open
Loop group, subjects flew on average 1.88 (SD = 0.85)
rounds beyond the optimum respectively. It appears that those
subjects, who decide to fly more rounds than optimal, they do
it clearly, i.e., usually by more than one round. Also, subjects
exceed the optimal number of rounds by, on average, one
more round in the closed loop compared to the open loop
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TABLE III
CATEGORIZATION OF DECISION BEHAVIOR BY TREATMENT. RELATIVE
SHARES REFERRING TO EACH TREATMENT ARE PRESENTED IN
PARENTHESIS.
Closed Loop Open Loop Total
Optimal 3 2 5
(5.36%) (4.26%) (4.85%)
Rather 5 6 10
overconfident (8.93%) (12.77%) (10.68%)
Strongly 24 16 40
overconfident (42.86%) (34.04%) (38.83%)
Rather 8 5 13
underconfident (14.29%) (10.64%) (12.62%)
Strongly 13 16 29
underconfident (23.21%) (34.04%) (28.16%)
Mixed 3 2 5
(5.36%) (4.26%) (4.85%)
Total 56 47 103
(100%) (100%) (100%)
system once they fly beyond the optimum. The difference
is statistically significant in a Mann-Whitney U-Test (Z =
7.393, p = 0.000) and match the observation of subjects in
the Closed Loop treatment flying more rounds overall and
accruing more information value in total.
To gain a more precise impression about the distribution
of subjects deviations from optimal behavior within each
treatment, we classify all subjects into broad categories. Sub-
jects that act in accordance with the strategy of flying until
reaching the fourth node at all traffic junctions are classified
as optimizing. A subject whose overconfidence degree exceeds
one third up to 0.5 is classified as rather overconfident. Once a
subject flies beyond the optimal number of rounds in more than
half of the junctions (i.e., displaying an overconfidence degree
over 0.5), this subject is considered strongly overconfident.
Analogously, the categories rather underconfident and strongly
underconfident are defined using the same thresholds in terms
of underconfidence degrees as the ones for overconfidence.
The sixth category, mixed, defines scenarios, in which subjects
show overconfident or underconfident behavior in at least
one junction but in less than one third of all junctions they
played (equaling overconfidence or underconfidence degrees
between 0 and 0.333). Since these subjects act optimizing in
some junctions but not in all, their behavior still contradicts
the notion of a strictly optimizing agent, although no clear
dominant decision-pattern can be assigned to this behavior.
The distribution of subjects into these categories by treatment
is displayed in Table III.||
According to Table III, only few subjects in each treatment
act optimally throughout. Rather, individual behavior deviates
from the optimal number of rounds in both directions. Ap-
proximately half of the subjects in both groups (Closed Loop:
51.79%, Open Loop: 46.81%) can be considered rather over-
confident or strongly overconfident. Additionally, large shares
of rather underconfident or strongly underconfident individuals
||Two subjects from the Closed Loop treatment were excluded, because
they crashed in the very first round at the first traffic junction, wherefore no
statement on their decision making behavior can be made.
(Closed Loop: 37.50%, Open Loop: 44.68%) are observed as
well. From the assumptions of MDPs and standard economic
theory follow notions of individuals as rationally optimizing
decision makers that leave no room for overconfident or
underconfident behavior. Consequently, our empirical results
do not meet these theoretical propositions. In fact, according to
a Binomial Test of the data for the Closed Loop treatment the
probability of observing 29 overconfident (rather or strongly
overconfident) subjects out of a sample of 56 is virtually
zero (p < 0.000001), given the assumption of optimizing
behavior. The same result is obtained for overconfidence in
the open loop systems. Consequently, we can fully support
H1, indicating a strong general tendency of individuals to
act overconfidently in CPHSs, regardless of whether receiving
immediate outcome feedback or not. While not part of the
hypothesis, we also observe the equivalent results for under-
confident behavior in both treatments.
B. Hot Hand Fallacy
In contrast to an open loop, only a closed loop system pro-
vides the threat of sequences of immediate outcome feedback
luring subjects into a hot hand fallacy. In our experiment, a
subject in the Closed Loop treatment is defined to have a
“hot hand” once it reaches the optimal node through obtaining
three increases in information value in a row even though the
first increase was certain. This corresponds to the common
perception of three repeated outcomes as a streak [90]. In this
case, an optimizing subject would stop flying when following
the one-stage optimal strategy, since three increases are nec-
essary to reach the optimum and flying beyond the optimum
yields a negative marginal gain. The outcome of prior rounds
should have no relevance for the subject’s decision, since the
rounds outcomes are independent from each other. If a subject
decides to continue flying though, it violates the heuristically
optimal decision rule, falling victim to the hot hand fallacy.
Overall, at 84 junctions the respective subject experienced
three continuous increases in information. In 70 out of these
84 cases (83.33%), subjects decided to fly at least one more
round thereby falling victim to the hot hand fallacy. This share
of hot hand fallacies among situations that pose the threat of
falling victim to it is highly statistically significant: Under
the assumption of subjects being optimizing Markov decision
makers, the probability of such a high proportion disobeying
the optimal strategy is practically zero (Binomial Test: Pr(all
subjects act optimally ∣ 83.33% of the hot hand situations
result in the hot hand fallacy): p < 0.0000001). Comparing
non-overconfident and overconfident decision making between
junctions with and without a hot hand in Table IV, we observe
those subjects who experience a hot hand situation (70 out
of 84, 83.33%) to have a significantly higher chance to act
overconfidently at that junction, compared to those subjects
who do not reach the optimum through three consecutive gains
in information value (123 out of 260, 47.31%). Running a Chi-
Squared Test to test the hypothesis statistically, we obtain a
highly significant relationship between hot hand situations and
subsequent overconfident behavior, i.e., the hot hand fallacy,
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TABLE IV
HOT HAND FALLACY - CHI-SQUARED TABLE. THE TEST CAPTURES EVERY
INSTANCE IN WHICH A SUBJECT STARTED FLYING AT ANY TRAFFIC
JUNCTION IN THE CLOSED LOOP TREATMENT.
Not overconfident Overconfident Total
No hot hand 137 123 260
Hot hand 14 70 84
Total 151 193 344
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF RISK CATEGORIES BY TREATMENT. PERCENTAGE
VALUES IN PARENTHESIS DISPLAY RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF RISK
PREFERENCES IN THE RESPECTIVE TREATMENT.
Closed Loop Open Loop Total
Risk averse 36 33 69
(63.16%) (68.75%) (65.71%)
Risk neutral 6 5 11
(10.53%) (10.42%) (10.48%)
Risk seeking 6 4 10
(10.53%) (8.33%) (9.52%)
Not identifiable 9 6 15
(15.79%) (12.50%) (14.29%)
Total 57 48 105
(100%) (100%) (100%)
with an error probability p of virtually zero (χ2(df = 1) ∶
33.46, p = 0.000). Consequently, H2 is strongly supported.
C. Risk Preferences
Subjects’ individual risk preferences are broadly classified
to be risk neutral, risk averse or risk seeking, see [89] and
Sidebar “Risk Preferences”. Given that the presented strategy
is based on the assumption of a risk neutral decision maker,
the observed distribution of risk preferences in each treatment
is displayed in Table V.** Consistent with the literature, the
clear majority of around two thirds of the subjects in both
treatments displays risk aversion. Overall, the distribution of
risk preferences appears very similar between the treatments,
with the relative shares of each risk attitude varying only
slightly between the groups. This impression is supported
by a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, in which the null
hypothesis that the risk preference distribution in the two
treatments is not statistically different from each other cannot
be rejected (D = 0.030, p > 0.1). Also, degrees of over-
confidence and underconfidence did not differ significantly
in between-treatment comparisons for each risk attitude using
Mann-Whitney U-tests.
Further, we did not observe risk seeking subjects to dis-
play significantly more overconfident behavior (Open Loop:∅ = 0.5257, Closed Loop: ∅ = 0.175) than risk neutral
(Open Loop: ∅ = 0.4333, Closed Loop: ∅ = 0.700) or risk
averse (Open Loop: ∅ = 0.4140, Closed Loop: ∅ = 0.3818)
individuals in either treatment (Kruskal-Wallis equality of
populations tests, Closed: H = 0.450, p = 0.7984, Open:
**Risk preferences of fifteen subjects in total could not be determined,
since their choices switched between Option A and Option B three times or
more.
H = 5.437, p = 0.0660)††. On the other hand, in the closed loop
system, we find risk averse subjects to be significantly more
underconfident, compared to the risk neutral and risk seeking
subjects (∅ underconfidence degree: 0.3480(SD = 0.3018),
Kruskal-Wallis equality of populations test: H = 8.891, p =
0.0117), while no effect was found in the open loop system.
Beside overconfidence, risk seeking preferences could in
theory present an alternative explanation for drone pilots
flying beyond the optimal number of rounds, with subjects
primarily aiming to achieve a large information value while
just hoping for their drones not to crash. However, we do not
find substantial differences in overconfidence conditional on
risk attitude between treatments and overall mainly observe
individuals who can be classified as risk averse. This would
theoretically predict subjects to decide rather conservatively
through settling for a lower number of rounds in order to
remain in the game and to protect the drone from crashing,
even at the cost of missing out higher payments from infor-
mation value gains. Since the experimental results display a
large share of subjects flying beyond the optimum, the case
for individual overconfidence as the dominant explanation for
inefficient drone piloting beyond the optimum is strengthened.
Consequently, we conclude risk preferences to not being
able to explain overconfident behavior although it appears to
explain the observed degrees of underconfidence).
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our experimental drone framework allows to observe how
individuals behave when faced with the task of piloting an
UAV under risk and uncertainty, paralleling a real-world
decision-problem. Even though a closed feedback loop was
identified to be the more successful system compared to open
loop operation, we still observed inefficient drone piloting
from the vast majority of subjects. Individuals expressed
both overconfident and underconfident behavioral tendencies,
regardless of receiving immediate outcome feedback. Specif-
ically, our results indicate that immediate outcome feedback,
that is originally intended to support optimal decision making,
can turn out to be rather counterproductive in this regard. Over-
confident decisions and consequently inefficient drone piloting
can be facilitated by the hot hand fallacy as a misinterpretation
of random sequences of immediate feedback on positive
outcomes, since subjects fail to realize such sequences to be
caused by chance and therefore being history independent. In
fact, a handful of subjects in the closed loop treatment stated in
the questionnaire that their decision strategy was to fly as long
as they achieved steady increases in information value, trying
to exploit an apparent hot hand. The fact that the possibility
for this fallacy is only given in a closed loop system, presents
an obvious weakness that should be considered in designing
such feedback policies.
In general, the current work exposes the human as an under
observed source of errors in human-in-the-loop control sys-
tems. We thus advise researchers and practitioners to carefully
††Note that statistical tests on risk preferences have to be interpreted with
caution, since the sample size of risk neutral and risk seeking individuals is
extremely low.
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account for the behavioral component in the control of cyber-
physical systems and the potential problems that arise from it,
besides mathematical model optimization only. In particular,
our findings illustrate the impact of behavioral biases regarding
effects of immediate feedback and the (miss-)understanding of
history independence in chance processes.
While more information is commonly regarded to result in
better decisions in cyber-physical systems, human susceptibil-
ity for perceptual biases in response to high information supply
has to be taken into account. Therefore, identifying an optimal
quantity and frequency of feedback remains a goal for future
research. We expect a carefully crafted intermittent feedback
to be better suited for this purpose and stress the need for
an intelligent feedback design that adapts to an individual’s
rationality in order provide suitable amount of information.
Generally, considering the effect of humans in control loops
more seriously presents an important issue for research and
practice. Overall, humans were shown to mostly not act
optimizing in the given decision-problem in our experimental
framework, which strongly puts the Markov decision maker
as an adequate characterization of human decision making
in question. Models of human decision processes should be
revisited to account for limits of cognitive capacities and
behavioral biases that result from them, in order to not
jeopardize technological accomplishments through erroneous
human decisions. Otherwise, individuals in human-in-the-loop
control might take unnecessarily high risk and render thought-
fully designed policies inefficient, as seen for highly frequent
feedback in the case of the hot hand fallacy.
Lastly, our study further provides a methodological con-
tribution to research on CPHSs, making a first approach to
incorporate insights from behavioral economics into control
engineering. Further it introduces incentivized economic ex-
periments as a viable option to reveal how individuals actually
behave, in contrast to how they are theoretically prescribed to
behave. We present an experimental UAV framework featuring
a sequential decision-problem, with a focus on behavioral
biases in relation to feedback policies. Future experimental
research in this area may intensify efforts of incorporating
various other behavioral phenomena and stylized facts into
control engineering by building upon this framework, in order
to design or test behavioral interventions that are able to
proactively counteract them.
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SIDEBARS
A. Sidebar: Behavioral Economic Engineering
The deviation between theoretically prescribed behavior and
actual human decision making is often labeled behavioral
messiness [91] and poses a huge challenge for organiza-
tional policy makers. Experiments thereby represent a tool for
bridging economic theory and real-world institutional design
in order to generate practical value from applied economic
science [91]. The laboratory basically acts as a wind tunnel
for practice in order to test behavioral reactions to institutional
interventions in a controlled environment, before implement-
ing them into the real world. Projects following this approach
are summed under the label of behavioral economic engineer-
ing [91]. Prominent examples include the implementation of
optimized retirement savings plans [92] and the redesign of
matching algorithms for American physicians [93].
B. Sidebar: Experimental research method and Induced Value
Theory
Behavioral economic findings are often based on experimen-
tal research, especially controlled laboratory experiments, as
“experimental control is exceptionally helpful for distinguish-
ing behavioral explanations from standard ones” [22]. Labo-
ratory experiments, which had been considered unfeasible for
economic disciplines and privilege of natural sciences up until
the late 20th century [94], aim to parallel real-world situations
in laboratory settings, while abstracting from environmental
factors. This means, experiments isolate certain variables of
interest from more complex real-world contexts, while simul-
taneously controlling for conditions of the subjects’ economic
and social environments [95]. Participants, commonly referred
to as “subjects”, work on computerized or analogue tasks, like
solving math problems [96] or assembling Lego figures [97],
accompanied by anonymously making decisions, which are
observed by the experimenter. Economic theories or concepts
that the experimenter wants to test usually underlie the deci-
sion to make in the experiment often in relation to a given
task. A constituting factor of experiments consists in them
being incentivized, i.e., the participants are paid for solving
tasks and making decisions by the experimenter, with the
concrete amount of payments depending on the respective
experimental design [95]. Subjects know about the payments
they are able to receive beforehand, as they receive instructions
containing the experimental procedure and the payoff function
in the beginning of every experiment. Herein lies the biggest
advantage of experimental economic research: actual human
behavior can be observed with the subjects actions having
actual monetary consequences for their payoffs in the end,
so they have to “put their money where their mouth is”.
This is not the case for other research methods used in
economic or social science like surveys or scenario studies,
in which participants only state how they would behave in
certain situations, while no information is gained whether they
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would actually behave the way they stated when faced with
the decision-problem in reality. The problems of intention-
behavior gaps [98] and giving socially desirable answers [99]
are well-known.
As a basic principle of economic experiments, there is no
deception by the experimenter. Subjects will be asked to do
exactly what is stated as their task in the instructions they
receive before the experiment and they will be paid exactly
according to the payoff function given in the instructions as
well [100]. Experiments can be used for various purposes like
testing economic theories and theoretical equilibria, testing
policies and environments, establishing phenomena, stylized
facts and new theories or deriving political recommendations
[95]. Furthermore, experimental evidence can be replicated
and re-evaluated by other experimenters using the same ex-
perimental setup and instructions, which are usually published
alongside the results [101].
In order to experimentally test certain theories or economic
interventions, subjects are randomly assigned into one control
group and (at least) one treatment group, in order to avoid
(self-)selection biases, with a treatment being the intervention
that is going to be tested. Differences between control group
and treatment group must thereby be reduced to exactly
one factor, namely the so-called treatment variable, i.e., the
intervention that the experimenter wants to evaluate [100].
Herein lies another major advantage of controlled economic
experiments as they allow causal inferences. Due to the ex-
perimental environment being held constant and environmental
factors being controlled for all groups, they cancel out through
comparative statics between groups. Therefore, outcome in
a treatment group compared to a control group can only
be caused by an exogenous change, i.e., by the treatment
intervention itself since it represents the only factor that differs
between groups [102], [22], [100].
As mentioned above, a constituent factor of economic
experiments consists in the provision of decision-dependent
monetary incentives. Economic experiments underlie the gen-
eral assumption that any kind of utility an individual experi-
ences can be expressed by an equivalent monetary incentive.
Through these incentives, the experimenter is able to induce
a certain utility function U(x) onto the subjects, in order to
neutralize the subjects inherent preferences for the duration
of the experiment. This “induced value theory” was originally
introduced by Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
laureate Vernon Smith [103]. According to him, subjects
should derive all utility from the monetary incentives provided
in the experiment itself, during their participation.
While the internal validity of experiments is usually rec-
ognized to be very strong, the external validity of these
experiments, i.e., the transferability of their results to the
world outside the laboratory, the external validity, is commonly
discussed and criticized by opponents of this methodology
[44], [100]. For instance, in the context of perceptional and
judgmental biases, laboratory settings are accused of changing
the environment in which a human makes efficient decisions
to an artificial one. However, it can be argued the other way
around in that laboratory experiments show people at their best
through providing all information necessary and eliminating
distractions [44]. If people fall to biases in this isolated, save
environment, they will likely do so outside of it as well.
C. Sidebar: Risk Preferences
Individual risk preferences represent a factor commonly
influencing human behavior that should necessarily be con-
sidered in order to explain individual decision making under
risk and uncertainty. Human risk preferences are generally
differentiated into risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking
behavior. They are usually determined by the individual’s
subjective evaluation of a probabilistic payment from a lottery
compared to a certainty equivalent, i.e., a safe fix payment
[104], [89]. If an individual subjectively judges the utility
from the expected value E of a payment X as higher than
the expected utility of such payment, namely u(X), then this
individual is classified as risk averse [105]:
u(E[X]) > E[u(X)]
As a consequence of Jensen’s inequality, a risk averse indi-
vidual’s personal utility function is concavely shaped. This
means that the individual is willing to sacrifice the chance of
higher but uncertain payments in order to receive a smaller but
certain payment, the certainty equivalent, thereby paying the
so-called insurance premium [105]. In an example by [106]
displayed in Fig. S1, an individual with e10 at his disposal
has to decide whether or not to participate in a lottery in which
e5 are gained with a probability of 50% and e5 are lost with
a probability of 50%. For a risk averse individual the utility of
the expected value u(10) is greater than the expected utility
of wealth 0.5u(15) + 0.5u(5).
The other way around, if an individual derives less utility
from the expectated value of X than the Xs expected utility
u(E[X]) < E[u(X)],
then this individual is considered risk seeking. Its subjective
utility function is convex (see the analogous example in Fig.
S2). Risk seeking individuals are willing to give up the
certainty equivalent in order to get the chance to play the
lottery through which they may obtain a higher payment, i.e.,
they favour gambling. The payment obtainable beyond the
certainty equivalent through playing the lottery is called risk
premium. In case an individual is indifferent between both
alternatives, the individual can be considered risk neutral, with
risk and insurance premium cancelling out [105].
Standard economic theories, in the tradition of the homo
oeconomicus, are usually based upon the explicit or implicit
assumption of individual risk neutrality, reflecting notion of
individuals as rationally optimizing (“Markovian”) decision
makers [107]. Contrarily, behavioral economic research usu-
ally observes risk averse decision makers, in the laboratory
[108], [109], as well as in the field [110].
The degree of human risk aversion was found to increase
with the size of incentives being at stake [111], [104], con-
tradicting theories of constant relative risk aversion [104].
However, individuals are observed to act clearly risk averse
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Wealth
Utility
u(wealth)
15105
u(5)
u(10)
u(15)
0.5u(5) + 0.5u(15)
u(10) > 0.5 u(5) + 0.5 u(15)
Fig. S1. Example for a risk averse individual’s utility function, adapted from
[106]
Wealth
Utility
u(wealth)
15105
u(5)
u(10)
u(15)
0.5u(5) + 0.5u(15)
u(10) < 0.5 u(5) + 0.5 u(15)
Fig. S2. Example for a risk seeking individual’s utility function, adapted
from [106]
even only with low incentives at stake, wherefore models
that assume risk neutral human behavior do not adequately
represent reality and may lead to biased inference [104].
Regardless of this quite clear evidence, only sporadic effort
exists in order to incorporate risk preferences other than risk
neutrality into Markov Decision Processes [112], [113].
D. Sidebar: Mulitiple Price List Format
Multiple price lists formats offer a simple but effective tool
to reveal subjects’ actual risk preferences. The basic concept
was designed with the goal of testing the standard economic
assumption of risk neutrality as well as the behavioral as-
sumption of constant relative risk aversion. The list consisted
of a table with two columns that represented two lotteries
the subjects had to choose between for ten rows featuring
varying probabilities of winning certain amounts of money
that remained constant for all rows [104]. As the original price
list contained monetary values with two decimals and varying
probabilities that had to be weighed, it can be assumed that
it was difficult for subjects to compare the different options.
The subsequent work [89] designed a more clear-cut version
of the multiple price list (see Table S1) in which subjects had
to choose between a safe payoff that increased by one Euro
with each row and a fair lottery that remained constant for all
rows.
Subjects are asked to indicate for each row whether they
prefer the offered safe payment (Option A) or the offered fair
TABLE S1
MULTIPLE PRICE LIST BY [89]
Option A Option B
1) e0 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%
2) e1 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%
3) e2 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%
4) e3 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%⋮ ⋮ ⋮
19) e18 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%
20) e19 safe e30 with a prob. of 50%, e0 with a prob. of 50%
lottery (Option B). The safe payment equals the number of
the respective row minus one (in Euro), starting at e0 in the
first row and increasing up to e19 in the twentieth row. The
lottery is the same in each row, containing a 50% chance to
win e30 and a 50% chance of winning nothing. A subject’s
risk attitude can be determined by observing the row in which
his choice changes from B to A. When continuously choosing
B until row 16 and continuously choosing A afterwards, a
subject is classified as risk neutral, as both options yield the
exact same expected payoffs of e15 in row 16. At this point
a risk neutral subject is indifferent between the receiving the
safe payment and playing the lottery. If the change from B to
A occurs before the sixteenth row, then a subject is classified
as risk averse, as it is willing to sacrificing the chance to play
a lottery that yields a higher expected payoff in favor of a safe
payment of a lower amount than such expected payoff. If the
change occurs after the sixteenth row, a subject is regarded as
risk seeking. Contrarily to risk averse subjects, risk seeking
subjects are willing to sacrifice a safe payment in order to be
able to play a lottery that yields an expected payoff that is
lower than safe payment but yields a higher maximum payoff.
After making their choices for every row, a fraction of
the participant group (e.g., every seventh [89] or fifteenth
[114] subject) is chosen at random and actually paid for one
randomly chosen row of the table, according to their respective
choice made in this row. This procedure incentivizes subjects
to choose in accordance with their true preferences in each
row, since they would forfeit expected utility if they did not,
thereby revealing them to the experimenter [89]. Therefore,
the multiple price list format presents an incentive-compatible
instrument to measure individual risk preferences.
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